Controlling
the Global Economy: Bilderberg, the Trilateral Commission and the Federal
Reserve
Andrew Gavin Marshall
Global Research
August 5, 2009
This essay is Part 3 of "Global Power and Global
Government," published by Global Research.
Part 1: Evolution and Revolution of the Central Banking System
Part 2: Origins of the American Empire: Revolution, World Wars and World
Order
The Bilderberg Group and the European Union Project
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The
first Bilderberg meeting in 1954. |
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In 1954, the Bilderberg Group was founded in the
Joseph Retinger, the founder of the Bilderberg Group,
was also one of the original architects of the European Common Market and a
leading intellectual champion of European integration. In 1946, he told the
Royal Institute of International Affairs (the British counterpart and sister
organization of the Council on Foreign Relations), that
The Bilderberg Group acts as a “secretive global
think-tank,” with an original intent to “to link governments and
economies in Europe and
Declassified documents (released in 2001) showed that
“the
The European Coal and Steel Community was formed in
1951, and signed by
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In 1992, the
Maastricht Treaty was signed, which created the European Union and led to the
creation of the Euro. |
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In 1957, two years later, the Treaty of Rome was
signed, which created the European Economic Community (EEC), also known as the
European Community. Over the decades, various other treaties were signed, and
more countries joined the European Community. In 1992, the Maastricht Treaty
was signed, which created the European Union and led to the creation of the
Euro. The European Monetary Institute was created in 1994, the European Central
Bank was founded in 1998, and the Euro was launched in 1999. Etienne Davignon,
Chairman of the Bilderberg Group and former EU Commissioner, revealed in March
of 2009 that the Euro was debated and planned at Bilderberg conferences.[11]
This was an example of regionalism, of integrating an entire region of the
world, a whole continent, into a large supranational structure. This was one of
the primary functions of the Bilderberg Group, which would also come to play a
major part in other international issues.
Interdependence Theory
The theoretical justifications for integration and
regionalism arrived in the 1960s with what is known as “interdependence
theory.” One of its primary proponents was a man named Richard N. Cooper.
Two other major proponents of interdependence theory are Robert Keohane and
Joseph Nye. Interdependence theory and theorists largely expand upon the
notions raised by Keynes.
Richard Cooper wrote that, during the 1960s
“there has been a strong trend toward economic interdependence among the
industrial countries. This growing interdependence makes the successful pursuit
of national economic objectives much more difficult.” He also identified
that “the objective of greater economic integration involves
international agreements which reduce the number of policy instruments
available to national authorities for pursuit of their economic
objectives.”[12] Further, “Cooper argues that new policies are
needed to address the unprecedented conditions of international
interdependence.”[13]
Cooper also opposed a return to mercantilist pursuits
in order for nations to secure economic objectives, arguing that,
“economic nationalism invited policy competition that is doomed to
fail,” and thus concludes “that international policy coordination
is virtually the only means to achieve national economic goals in an
interdependent world.”[14]
Keohane and Nye go into further analysis of
interdependence, specifically focusing on how interdependence transforms
international politics. They tend to frame their concepts in ideological
opposition to international relations realists, who view the world, like
mercantilists, as inherently anarchic. Keohane and Nye construct what is known
as “complex interdependence,” in which they critique realism. They
analyze realism as consisting of two primary facets: that states are the main
actors in the international arena, and that military force is central in
international power. They argue that, “global economic interdependence
has cast doubt on these assumptions. Transnational corporations and
organizations born of economic integration now vie with states for global
influence.”[15]
Keohane and Nye also discuss the relevance and
importance of international regimes in the politics of interdependence,
defining regimes as “networks of rules, norms, and procedures that
regularize behavior.” They argue that, “Regimes are affected by the
distribution of power among states, but regimes, in turn, may critically
influence the bargaining process among states.”[16] Again, this contests
the realist and mercantilist notions of the international sphere being one of
chaos, as a regime can produce and maintain order within the international
arena.
Interdependence theorists tend to argue that
interdependence has altered the world order in that it has become based upon
cooperation and mutual interests, largely championing the liberal economic
notion of a non-chaotic and cooperative international order in which all
nations seek and gain a mutual benefit. Ultimately, it justifies the continued
process of global economic integration, while realist and mercantilist
theorists, who interdependence theorists contest and debate, justify the use of
force in the international arena in terms of describing it as inherently
chaotic. In theory, the notions of mercantilism and liberalism are inimical to
one another however, they are not mutually exclusive and are, in fact, mutually
reinforcing. Events throughout the 1970s are a clear example of this mutually
reinforcing nature of mercantilist behaviour on the part of states, and the
“interdependence” of the liberal economic order.
As early mercantilist theorist Frederick List wrote in
regards to integration and union, “All examples which history can show
are those in which the political union has led the way, and the commercial
union has followed. Not a single instance can be adduced in which the latter
has taken the lead, and the former has grown up from it.”[17] It would
appear that the elites have chosen the road less traveled in the 20th century,
with the Bilderberg Group pursuing integration and union in Europe by starting
with commercial union and having political union follow. This concept is also
evident in the notions of interdependence theory, which focuses on global
economic integration as changing the realist/mercantilist notions of a chaotic
international order, as states and other actors become more cooperative through
such economic ties.
Trilateralism
In the late 1960s, Western European economies (in
particular
Richard Nixon took decisive, and what many referred to
as “protectionist” measures, and in 1971, ended the dollar’s
link to gold, which “resulted in a devaluation of the dollar as it began
to float against other currencies,” and “was meant to restore the
competitiveness of the US economy,”[19] as with devaluation,
“U.S.-made goods would cost less to foreigners and foreign-made goods
would be less competitive on the U.S. market.” The second major action
taken by Nixon was when he “slapped a ten percent surcharge on most
imports into the
An article in Foreign Affairs, the journal of the
Council on Foreign Relations, referred to Nixon’s New Economic Policy as
“protectionist,” encouraging a “disastrous isolationist
trend,”[21] and that Nixon shattered “the linchpin of the entire
international monetary system— on whose smooth functioning the world
economy depends.”[22] Another article in Foreign Affairs explained that
the Atlanticist, or internationalist faction of the US elite were in
particular, upset with Nixon’s New Economic Policy, however, they
“agreed on the diagnosis: the relative balance of economic strengths had
so changed that the United States could no longer play the role of economic
leader. But they also argued that further American unilateralism would fuel a
spiral of defensive reactions that would leave all the Western economies worse
off. Their suggested remedy, instead, was much more far-reaching coordination
among all the trilateral [North American, European and Japanese]
governments.”[23]
There was a consensus within the American ruling class
that the Bretton Woods System was in need of a change, but there were divisions
among members in how to go about changing it. The more powerful (and wealthy) international
wing feared how US policies may isolate and alienate Western Europe and Japan,
and they advocated that, “The world economic roles of America must be
reconciled with the growth to power of Europe and Japan. There must be
fundamental reform of the international monetary system. There must be renewed
efforts to reduce world trade barriers. The underlying
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In
1970, David Rockefeller became Chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations,
while also being Chairman and CEO of Chase Manhattan. |
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In 1970, David Rockefeller became Chairman of the
Council on Foreign Relations, while also being Chairman and CEO of Chase
Manhattan. In 1970, an academic who joined the Council on Foreign Relations in
1965 wrote a book called Between Two Ages:
A 1976 article in Foreign Affairs explained that,
“Trilateralism as a linguistic expression—and the Trilateral
Commission—arose in the early 1970s from the reaction of the more
Atlanticist part of the American foreign policy community to the belligerent
and defensive unilateralism that characterized the foreign economic policy of
the Nixon Administration.”[25] The Commission’s major concerns were
to preserve for the “industrialized societies,” in other words,
seek mutual gain for the Trilateral nations, and to construct “a common
approach to the needs and demands of the poorer nations.” However, this
should be read as, “constructing a common approach to [dealing with]
poorer nations.” As well as this, the Commission would undertake
“the coordination of defense policies and of policies toward such highly
politicized issues as nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and aerial hijacking,
and such highly politicized geographic areas as the Middle East or
Interestingly, interdependence theorist Joseph Nye is
a member of the Trilateral Commission, as is Richard N. Cooper.[27] Today,
Joseph Nye is a member of the Board of Directors of the Council on Foreign
Relations,[28] and Richard N. Cooper was a Director of the Council on Foreign
Relations from 1993-1994.[29]
The end of the link of the dollar to gold meant that,
“the US was no longer subject to the discipline of having to try to
maintain a fixed par value of the dollar against gold or anything else: it
could let the dollar move as the US Treasury [and ultimately, the Federal
Reserve] wished and pointed towards the removal of gold from international
monetary affairs.” This created a dollar standard, as opposed to a gold
standard, which “places the direction of the world monetary policy in the
hands of a single country,” which was “not acceptable to Western
Europe or
The Oil Crisis
The May 1973 meeting of the Bilderberg Group occurred
five months prior to the extensive oil price rises brought about by the Yom
Kippur War. However, according to leaked minutes from the meeting, a 400%
increase in the price of oil was discussed, and meeting participants were
creating a “plan [on] how to manage the about-to-be-created flood of oil
dollars.”[31] Oil is no issue foreign to the interests of the Bilderberg
Group, as among the 1973 participants were the CEOs of Royal Dutch Shell, British
Petroleum (BP), Total S.A., ENI, Exxon, as well as significant banking
interests and individuals such as Baron Edmond de Rothschild and David
Rockefeller, and the US Secretary of State at the time, Henry Kissinger.[32]
In 1955, Henry Kissinger, a young scholar at the time,
was brought into the Council on Foreign Relations, where he distinguished
himself as a prominent Council member and became a protégé to
Nelson Rockefeller, one of David Rockefeller’s brothers. In 1969,
Kissinger became Richard Nixon’s National Security Adviser.[33] This
Bilderberg meeting was taking place during a time of great international
instability, particularly in the
Kissinger, as National Security Adviser, was in a
power struggle with Secretary of State William Rogers over foreign policy.
Nixon even referred to the continual power struggle between Kissinger as
National Security Advisor and Secretary of State William Rogers, saying that,
“Henry’s personality problem is just too goddamn difficult for us
to deal [with],” and that Kissinger’s “psychopathic about
trying to screw [Secretary of State William] Rogers.” Nixon even said
that if Kissinger wins the struggle against
At the time of the Yom Kippur War, Nixon was in the
middle of major domestic issues, as the Watergate scandal was breaking, leading
to an increase in the power and influence of Kissinger, as “The president
was deeply preoccupied, and at times incapacitated by self-pity or
alcohol.”[35] By 1970, Kissinger had
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Kissinger said
the Rockefeller family represents “what goes for an aristocracy in our
country.” |
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As Kissinger later said in a speech marking the 25th
anniversary of the Trilateral Commission, “In 1973, when I served as
Secretary of State, David Rockefeller showed up in my office one day to tell me
that he thought I needed a little help,” and that, “David’s
function in our society is to recognize great tasks, to overcome the obstacles,
to help find and inspire the people to carry them out, and to do it with
remarkable delicacy.” Kissinger finished his speech by saying,
“David, I respect you and admire you for what you have done with the
Trilateral Commission. You and your family have represented what goes for an
aristocracy in our country—a sense of obligation not only to make it
materially possible, but to participate yourself in what you have made possible
and to infuse it with the enthusiasm, the innocence, and the faith that I
identify with you and, if I may say so, with your family.”[37]
Kissinger sabotaged
On October 4, the US National Security Agency (NSA)
“knew beyond a shadow of a doubt that an attack on
With the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War on October 6,
1973, Kissinger “centered control of the crisis in his own hands.”
After the Israelis informed the White House that the attack on them had taken
place, Kissinger did not consult Nixon or even inform him on anything for three
hours, who was at his retreat in
On October 12, the major American oil companies sent a
letter to Nixon suggesting the Arab countries “should receive some price
increase,” and Nixon, following Kissinger’s advice, sent arms to
Israel, which precipitated the Arab OPEC countries to announce a 70% increase
in the price of oil on October 16th, and announce an oil embargo against the US
on the 17th.[42]
The Bilderberg meeting five months prior involved
participants planning “how to manage the about-to-be-created flood of oil
dollars.” At the meeting, an OPEC Middle East oil revenue rise of over
400% was predicted. A Bilderberg document from the meeting stated that,
“The task of improving relations between energy importing countries
should begin with consultations between Europe, the
As economist F. William Engdahl noted in his book, A
Century of War, “One enormous consequence of the ensuing 400 per cent
rise in OPEC oil prices was that investments of hundreds of millions of dollars
by British Petroleum, Royal Dutch Shell [both present at Bilderberg] and other
Anglo-American petroleum concerns in the risky North Sea could produce oil at a
profit,” as “the profitability of these new North Sea oilfields was
not at all secure until after the OPEC price rises.”[44] In 2001, the
former Saudi representative to OPEC, Sheik Ahmed Yamani, said, “’I
am 100 per cent sure that the Americans were behind the increase in the price
of oil. The oil companies were in real trouble at that time, they had borrowed
a lot of money and they needed a high oil price to save them.” When he
was sent by King Faisal to the Shah of Iran in 1974, the Shah said that it was
Henry Kissinger who wanted a higher price for oil.[45]
An article in Foreign Policy, the journal published by
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, concluded from exhaustive
research, that, “Since 1971, the United States has encouraged Middle East
oil-producing states to raise the price of oil and keep it up.” This
conclusion was based upon State Department documents, congressional testimony
and interviews with former policy-makers.[46] At the Eighth Petroleum Congress
of the League of Arab States (Arab League) in 1972, James Akins, head of the
fuel and energy section of the State Department, gave a speech in which he said
that oil prices were “expected to go up sharply due to lack of short-term
alternatives to Arab oil,” and that this was, “an unavoidable
trend.” A Western observer at the meeting said Akins’ speech was
essentially, “advocating that Arabs raise the price of oil to $5 per
barrel.” The oil industry itself was also becoming more unified in their
position. The National Petroleum Council (NPC), “a government advisory
body representing oil industry interests, waited until Nixon was safely
re-elected before publishing a voluminous series of studies calling for a
doubling of U.S. oil and gas prices.”[47]
The summer before the Yom Kippur War, in 1973, James
Akins was made U.S. Ambassador to
The oil companies themselves were also fearful of
having their business facilities in OPEC countries nationalized, so they
“were anxious to engage OPEC countries in the oil business in the
U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, James Akins, later
testified in congress on the fact that when, in 1975, the Saudis went to Iran
to try to get the Shah to roll back the price of oil, they were told that
Kissinger told the Iranians that, “the United States understood
Iran’s desire for higher oil prices.”[51] Akins was removed from
The OPEC oil price increases resulted in the
“removal of some withholding taxes on foreign investment” in the
United States, “unchecked arms sales, which cannot be handled without
U.S. support personnel, to Iran and Saudi Arabia,” as well as an
“attempt to suppress publication of data on volume of OPEC funds on
deposit with U.S. banks.”[53] Ultimately, the price increases
“would be of competitive advantage to the
In 1974, when a White House official suggested to the
Treasury to force OPEC to lower the price of oil, his idea was swept under, and
he later stated that, “It was the banking leaders who swept aside this
advice and pressed for a ‘recycling’ program to accommodate to
higher oil prices.” In 1975, a Wall Street investment banker was sent to
In 1974, another OPEC oil price increase of more than
100 percent was undertaken, following a meeting in
As Peter Gowan stated in The Globalization Gamble,
“the oil price rises were the result of US influence on the oil states
and they were arranged in part as an exercise in economic statecraft directed
against America’s ‘allies’ in Western Europe and Japan. And
another dimension of the Nixon administration’s policy on oil price rises
was to give a new role, through them, to the
In 1973, David Rockefeller set up the Trilateral
Commission to promote coordination and cooperation among Japan, Western Europe,
and North America (namely, the US), yet, in the same year, his good friend and
close confidante, Henry Kissinger, played a key role in promoting and
orchestrating the oil price rises that had a damaging impact upon Japan and
Western Europe. Also it should be noted, David Rockefeller’s Chase
Manhattan Bank, of which he was CEO at the time, profited immensely off of the
petrodollar recycling system promoted by Henry Kissinger, where the OPEC
countries would reinvest their new excess capital into the American economy
through
How does one account for these seemingly diametrically
opposed initiatives? Perhaps the oil crisis, having a negative effect on
It is of vital importance to understand the global
conditions in which the price rises and its solutions arose, particularly in
relation to the
So, by manipulating the price of oil, you can
manipulate the development of the
The banks that were getting massive amounts of
petrodollars deposited into them from the oil producing countries needed to
“recycle” the dollars by investing them somewhere, in order to make
a profit. Luckily for the banks, “[d]eveloping countries were desperate
for funds to help them industrialize their economies. In some cases, developing
countries were oil consumers and required loans to help pay for rising oil
prices. In other cases, a decision had been made to follow a strategy of
indebted industrialization. This meant that states borrowed money to invest in
industrialization and would pay off the loans from the profits of their new
industries. Loans were an attractive option because they did not come with the
influence of foreign transnational corporations that accompanied foreign direct
investment and most states had few funds of their own to invest.”[61]
The oil price rises “changed the face of world
finance,” as: “In the new era of costly energy, scores of
countries, not all of them in the
According to a report produced by the Federal Reserve,
prior to the 1973 oil crisis, “the private Japanese financial system
remained largely isolated from the rest of the world. The system was highly
regulated,” and, “various types of banking firms and other
financial service firms were legally and administratively confined to a
specified range of activities assigned to each.” However, the “OPEC
oil shock in 1973 signaled a turning point in the operation of the Japanese
financial system.”[63] As part of this turning point, the Bank of Japan
(the central bank of
Of great significance was that, “the new
international monetary arrangements gave the
The Federal Reserve’s response to the initial
1973-74 oil price shock was to keep interest rates low, which led to inflation
and a devalued dollar. It’s also what allowed and encouraged banks to
lend massive amounts to developing countries, often lending more than their net
worth. However, in 1979, with the second oil shock, the Federal Reserve changed
policy, and the true nature of the original oil crisis, petrodollar recycling
and loans became apparent.
The Rise of Neo-Liberalism
In the early 1970s, the government of
As author Peter Dale Scott analyzed in his book, The
Road to 9/11, David Rockefeller played a pivotal role in the events in
In the same month that Kissinger met with Edwards, the
National Security Council (of which Kissinger held the top post) authorized CIA
“spoiling operations” to prevent the election of Allende. David
Rockefeller had known Doonie Edwards from the Business Group for Latin America
(BGLA), which was founded by Rockefeller in 1963, later to be named the Council
of the
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General
Augusto Pinochet orchestrated a coup d’état, with the aid and
participation of the CIA, against the Allende government of |
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However, before Edwards met with the CIA director,
Henry Kissinger had met privately with “David Rockefeller, chairman of
the Chase Manhattan Bank, which had interests in
On September 11, 1973, General Augusto Pinochet
orchestrated a coup d’état, with the aid and participation of the
CIA, against the Allende government of
In essence,
Globalization: A Liberal-Mercantilist Economic Order?
Neo-Liberals Take the Forefront
In 1971, Jimmy Carter, a somewhat obscure governor
from
When Jimmy Carter became President, he appointed over
two-dozen members of the Trilateral Commission to key positions in his cabinet,
among them, Zbigniew Brzezinski, who became National Security Adviser; Samuel
P. Huntington, Coordinator of National Security and Deputy to Brzezinski;
Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense; Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of
State; Walter Mondale, Vice President; Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State; and in
1979, he appointed David Rockefeller’s friend, Paul Volcker, as Chairman
of the Federal Reserve Board.[74]
In 1979, the Iranian Revolution spurred another
massive increase in the price of oil. The Western nations, particularly the
However, in 1979, the Federal Reserve, now the
lynch-pin of the international monetary system, which was awash in
petro-dollars (US dollars) as a result of the 1973 oil crisis, decided to take
a different action from the one it had taken earlier. In August of 1979,
“on the advice of David Rockefeller and other influential voices of the
Wall Street banking establishment, President Carter appointed Paul A. Volcker,
the man who, back in August 1971, had been a key architect of the policy of
taking the dollar off the gold standard, to head the Federal
Reserve.”[77]
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In the early
60s, Volcker went to work in the Treasury Department, and returned to Chase
in 1965 “as an aide to Rockefeller, this time as vice president dealing
with international business.” |
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Volcker got his start as a staff economist at the New
York Federal Reserve Bank in the early 50s. After five years there,
“David Rockefeller’s Chase Bank lured him away.”[78] So in
1957, Volcker went to work at Chase, where Rockefeller “recruited him as
his special assistant on a congressional commission on money and credit in
In 1979, Carter gave the job of Treasury Secretary to
Arthur Miller, who had been Chairman of the Fed. This left an opening at the Fed,
which was initially offered by Carter to David Rockefeller, who declined, and
then to A.W. Clausen, Chairman of Bank of America, who also declined. Carter
repeatedly tried to get Rockefeller to accept, and ultimately Rockefeller
recommended Volcker for the job.[81] Volcker became Chairman of the Federal
Reserve System, and immediately took drastic action to fight inflation by
radically increasing interest rates.
The world was taken by shock. This was not a policy
that would only be felt in the
In the developing world, states that had to import oil
faced enormous bills to cover their debts, and even oil producing countries,
such as Mexico, faced huge problems as they had borrowed heavily in order to
industrialize, and then suffered when oil prices fell again as the recession
occurring in the developed states reduced demand. Thus, in 1982,
The IMF and World Bank entered the scene newly
refurnished with a whole new outlook and policy program designed just in time
for the arrival of the debt crisis. The IMF “negotiated standby loans
with debtors offering temporary assistance to states in need. In return for the
loans states agreed to undertake structural adjustment programs (SAPs). These
programs entailed the liberalization of economies to trade and foreign
investment as well as the reduction of state subsidies and bureaucracies to
balance national budgets.”[84] Thus, the neoliberal project of 1973 in
Neoliberalism is “a particular organization of
capitalism, which has evolved to protect capital(ism) and to reduce the power
of labour. This is achieved by means of social, economic and political
transformations imposed by internal forces as well as external pressure,”
and it entails the “shameless use of foreign aid, debt relief and balance
of payments support to promote the neoliberal programme, and diplomatic
pressure, political unrest and military intervention when necessary.”[85]
Further, “neoliberalism is part of a hegemonic project concentrating
power and wealth in elite groups around the world, benefiting especially the
financial interests within each country, and
Joseph Stiglitz, former Chief Economist of the World
Bank, wrote in his book, Globalization and its Discontents, “In the
1980s, the Bank went beyond just lending for projects (like roads and dams) to
providing broad-based support, in the form of structural adjustment loans; but
it did this only when the IMF gave its approval – and with that approval
came IMF-imposed conditions on the country.”[87] As economist Michel
Chossudovsky wrote, “Because countries were indebted, the Bretton Woods
institutions were able to oblige them through the so-called
‘conditionalities’ attached to the loan agreements to appropriately
redirect their macro-economic policy in accordance with the interests of the
official and commercial creditors.”[88]
The nature of SAPs is such that the conditions imposed
upon countries that sign onto these agreements include: lowering budget
deficits, devaluing the currency, limiting government borrowing from the
central bank, liberalizing foreign trade, reducing public sector wages, price
liberalization, deregulation and altering interest rates.[89] For reducing
budget deficits, “precise ‘ceilings’ are placed on all
categories of expenditure; the state is no longer permitted to mobilize its own
resources for the building of public infrastructure, roads, or hospitals,
etc.”[90]
Joseph Stiglitz wrote that, “the IMF staff
monitored progress, not just on the relevant indicators for sound
macromanagement – inflation, growth, and unemployment – but on
intermediate variables, such as the money supply,” and that “In
some cases the agreements stipulated what laws the country’s Parliament
would have to pass to meet IMF requirements or ‘targets’ –
and by when.”[91] Further, “The conditions went beyond economics
into areas that properly belong in the realm of politics,” and that
“the way conditionality was imposed made the conditions politically
unsustainable; when a new government came into power, they would be abandoned.
Such conditions were seen as the intrusion by the new colonial power on the
country’s own sovereignty.”[92]
“The phrase ‘Washington Consensus’
was coined to capture the agreement upon economic policy that was shared
between the two major international financial institutions in Washington (IMF
and World Bank) and the US government itself. This consensus stipulated that
the best path to economic development was through financial and trade
liberalization and that international institutions should persuade countries to
adopt such measures as quickly as possible.”[93] The debt crisis provided
the perfect opportunity to quickly impose these conditions upon countries that were
not in a position to negotiate and with no time to spare, desperately in need
of loans. Without the debt crisis, such policies may have been subject to
greater scrutiny, and with a case-by-case analysis of countries adopting SAPs,
the world would become quickly aware of their dangerous implications. The debt
crisis was absolutely necessary in implementing the SAPs on an international
scale in a short amount of time.
The effect became quite clear, as the result “of
these policies on the population of developing countries was devastating. The
1980s is known as the ‘lost decade’ of development. Many developing
countries’ economies were smaller and poorer in 1990 than in 1980. Over
the 1980s and 1990s, debt in many developing countries was so great that
governments had few resources to spend on social services and
development.”[94] With the debt crisis, countries in the developing world
were “[s]tarved of international finance, [and] states had little choice
but to open their economies to foreign investors and trade.”[95] The
“
A Return to Statist Theory
Since the 1970s, mercantilist thought had re-emerged
in mainstream political-economic theory. Under various names such as
neo-mercantilism, economic nationalism or statism, they hold as vital the
centrality of the state in the global political economy. Much
“Globalization” literature puts an emphasis on the “decline
of the state” in the face of an integrated international economic order,
where borders are made illusory. However, statist theory at least helps us
understand that the state is still a vital factor within the global political
economy, even in the midst of a neo-liberal economic order.
Within the neo-liberal economic order, it was the
powerful western (primarily US and Western European) states that imposed
neo-mercantilist or statist policies in order to protect and promote their
interests within the global political economy. Some of these methods were
revolved around policy tools such as export subsidies, imposed to lower the
price of goods, which would make them more attractive to importers, giving that
particular nation an advantage over the competition.
For example, the
With the statist approach, theorists examine how the
state is still relevant in shaping economic outcomes and still remains a
powerful entity in the international arena. One theorist who is prominent
within the statist school is Robert Gilpin. Gilpin, a professor at the Woodrow
Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at
One cannot deny the significance of the state in the
global political economy, as it has been, and still remains very relevant. The
events of 1973 are exemplary of this, however, more must be examined in order
to better understand the situation. Though states are still prominent actors,
it is vital to address in whose interest they act. Mercantilist and statist
theorists tend to focus on the concept that states act in their own selfish
interest, for the benefit of the state, both politically and economically.
However, this is somewhat linear and diversionary, as it does not address the
precise structure of the state economy, specifically in terms of its monetary
and central banking system.
States, most especially the large hegemonic ones, such
as the United States and Great Britain, are controlled by the international
central banking system, working through secret agreements at the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS), and operating through national central banks
(such as the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve). The state is thus owned
by an international banking cartel, and though the state acts in such a way
that proves its continual relevance in the global economy, it acts so not in
terms of self-interest for the state itself, but for the powerful interests
that control that state. The same international banking cartel that controls
the
In this sense, interdependence theory, which presumes
the decline of the state in international affairs, fails to acknowledge the
role of the state in promoting and undertaking the process of interdependence.
The decline of the nation-state is a state-driven process, and is a process
that leads to a rise of the continental state and the global state. States, are
still very relevant, but both liberal and mercantilist theorists, while helpful
in understanding the concepts behind the global economy, lay the theoretical
groundwork for a political economic agenda being undertaken by powerful
interests. Like Robert Cox said, “Theory is always for someone and for
some purpose.”
Hegemonic-Stability Theory
In his book, Global Political Economy, Gilpin
explained that, “In time, if unchecked, the integration of an economy
into the world economy, the intensifying pressures of foreign competition, and
the necessity to be efficient in order to survive economically could undermine
the independence of a society and force it to adopt new values and forms of
social organization. Fear that economic globalization and the integration of
national markets are destroying or could destroy the political, economic, and
cultural autonomy of national societies has become widespread.”[96]
However, Gilpin explains that the “Creation of
effective international regimes and solutions to the compliance problem require
both strong international leadership and an effective international governance
structure.” Yet, he explains, “Regimes in themselves cannot provide
governance structure because they lack the most critical component of
governance – the power to enforce compliance. Regimes must rest instead
on a political base established through leadership and cooperation.”[97]
This is where we see the emergence of Hegemonic Stability Theory.
Gilpin explains that, “The theory of hegemonic
stability posits that the leader or hegemon facilitates international
cooperation and prevents defection from the rules of the regime through use of
side payments (bribes), sanctions, and/or other means, but can seldom, if ever,
coerce reluctant states to obey the rules of a liberal international economic
order.” As he explained, “The American hegemon did indeed play a
crucial role in establishing and managing the world economy following World War
II.”[98]
The roots of Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST) lie
within both liberal and statist theory, as it is representative of a crossover
theory that cannot be so easily placed in either category. The main concept
champions the liberal notion of the open international economic system, guided
by liberal principles of open-markets and free trade, while bringing in the
statist concept of a single hegemonic state representing the concentration of
political and economic power, as it is the enforcer of the liberal international
economy.
The more liberal-leaning theorists of HST argue that a
liberal economic order requires a strong, hegemonic state to maintain the
smooth functioning of the international economy. One thing this state must do
is maintain the international monetary system, as
Regime Theory
Regime Theory is another crossover theory between
liberal and mercantilist theorists. Its rise was primarily in reaction to the
emergence of Hegemonic Stability Theory, in order to address the concern of a
perceived decline in the power of the
In this sense, Regime Theory has identified an
important aspect of the global political economy, in that though states have
upheld the international order in the past, never before has there been such an
undertaking to institutionalize the authority over the international order
through international organizations. These organizations, such as the World
Bank, IMF, UN, and WTO, though still controlled and influenced by states,
predominantly the international hegemon, the
Notes
[1] CBC,
Informal forum or global conspiracy? CBC News Online: June 13, 2006: http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/bilderberg-group/
[2] Holly
Sklar, ed., Trilateralism: The Trilateral Commission and Elite Planning for
World Management. (South End Press: 1980), 161-171
[3] Holly
Sklar, ed., Trilateralism: The Trilateral Commission and Elite Planning for
World Management. (South End Press: 1980), 161-162
[4] CFR, The
First Transformation. CFR History: http://www.cfr.org/about/history/cfr/first_transformation.html
[5] Glen
McGregor, Secretive power brokers meeting coming to
[6] William
F. Jasper, Rogues’ gallery of EU founders. The New American: July 12,
2004: http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JZS/is_14_20/ai_n25093084/pg_1?tag=artBody;col1
[7] Ambrose
Evans-Pritchard, Euro-federalists financed by US spy chiefs. The Telegraph:
June 19, 2001: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/1356047/Euro-federalists-financed-by-US-spy-chiefs.html
[8] Ambrose
Evans-Pritchard, Euro-federalists financed by US spy chiefs. The Telegraph:
June 19, 2001: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/1356047/Euro-federalists-financed-by-US-spy-chiefs.html
[9]
Bilderberg Group,
http://wikileaks.org/leak/bilderberg-meetings-report-1955.pdf
[10] Who are these
Bilderbergers and what do they do? The Sunday Herald: May 30, 1999: http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4156/is_19990530/ai_n13939252
[11] Andrew Rettman,
‘Jury’s out’ on future of
[12] George T. Crane,
Abla Amawi, The Theoretical evolution of international political economy.
Oxford University Press
[13] George T. Crane,
Abla Amawi, The Theoretical evolution of international political economy.
Oxford University Press
[14] George T. Crane,
Abla Amawi, The Theoretical evolution of international political economy.
Oxford University Press
[15] George T. Crane,
Abla Amawi, The Theoretical evolution of international political economy.
Oxford University Press
[16] George T. Crane,
Abla Amawi, The Theoretical evolution of international political economy.
Oxford University Press
[17] George T. Crane,
Abla Amawi, The Theoretical evolution of international political economy.
Oxford University Press
[18] Holly Sklar, ed.,
Trilateralism: The Trilateral Commission and Elite Planning for World
Management. South End Press: 1980: page 65
[19] Robert
O’Brien and Marc Williams, Global Political Economy: Evolution and
Dynamics, 2nd ed. Palgrave Macmillan: 2007: page 215
[20] Holly Sklar, ed.,
Trilateralism: The Trilateral Commission and Elite Planning for World
Management. South End Press: 1980: pages 66-67
[21] Holly Sklar, ed.,
Trilateralism: The Trilateral Commission and Elite Planning for World
Management. South End Press: 1980: page 67
[22] C. Fred Bergsten,
The New Economics and US Foreign Policy. Foreign Affairs: January, 1972: page
199
[23] Richard H. Ullman,
Trilateralism: “Partnership” For What? Foreign Affairs: October,
1976: pages 3-4
[24] Holly Sklar, ed.,
Trilateralism: The Trilateral Commission and Elite Planning for World
Management. South End Press: 1980: pages 76-78
[25] Richard H. Ullman,
Trilateralism: “Partnership” For What? Foreign Affairs: October,
1976: page 3
[26] Richard H. Ullman,
Trilateralism: “Partnership” For What? Foreign Affairs: October,
1976: page 5
[27] Congressional
Research Service, TRILATERAL COMMISSION. The Library of Congress: pages 13-14: http://www.scribd.com/doc/5014337/Trilateral-Commission
[28] CFR, Joseph S. Nye,
Jr.. Board of Directors: http://www.cfr.org/bios/1330/joseph_s_nye_jr.html
[29] Annual Report, The
Council on Foreign Relations. Historical Roster of Directors and Officers,
2008: page 78
[30] Peter Gowan, The
Globalization Gamble: The
[31] William Engdahl, A
Century of War: Anglo-American Oil Politics and the New World Order. (
[32] William Engdahl, A
Century of War: Anglo-American Oil Politics and the New World Order. (
[33] CFR,
“X” Leads the Way. CFR History: http://www.cfr.org/about/history/cfr/x_leads.html
[34] Robert Dallek, The
Kissinger Presidency. Vanity Fair: May 2007: http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2007/05/kissinger200705
[35] Ibid.
[36] David Stout, William P.
Rogers, Who Served as Nixon’s Secretary of State, Is Dead at 87. The New York
Times: January 4, 2001: http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B02E5D6113BF937A35752C0A9679C8B63
[37] TC, Tributes to
David Rockefeller, Founder and Honorary Chairman. The Trilateral Commission:
December 1, 1998: http://www.trilateral.org/nagp/regmtgs/98/1201tribs.htm
[38] John Loftus and
Mark Aarons, The Secret War Against the Jews: How Western Espionage Betrayed
the Jewish People. St. Martin’s
[39] John Loftus and
Mark Aarons, The Secret War Against the Jews: How Western Espionage Betrayed
the Jewish People. St. Martin’s
[40] John Loftus and
Mark Aarons, The Secret War Against the Jews: How Western Espionage Betrayed
the Jewish People. St. Martin’s
[41] Robert Dallek, The
Kissinger Presidency. Vanity Fair: May 2007: http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2007/05/kissinger200705
[42] John Loftus and
Mark Aarons, The Secret War Against the Jews: How Western Espionage Betrayed
the Jewish People. St. Martin’s
[43] F. William Engdahl, A
Century of War: Anglo-American Oil Politics and the New World Order.
[44] F. William Engdahl,
A Century of War: Anglo-American Oil Politics and the New World Order.
[45] The Observer, Saudi
dove in the oil slick. The Guardian: January 14, 2001: http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2001/jan/14/globalrecession.oilandpetrol
[46] V.H. Oppenheim, Why
Oil Prices Go Up (1) The Past: We Pushed Them. Foreign Policy: No. 25, Winter,
1976-1977: page 24
[47] V.H. Oppenheim, Why
Oil Prices Go Up (1) The Past: We Pushed Them. Foreign Policy: No. 25, Winter,
1976-1977: pages 31-33
[48] IPC, James Akins.
[49] V.H. Oppenheim, Why
Oil Prices Go Up (1) The Past: We Pushed Them. Foreign Policy: No. 25, Winter,
1976-1977: pages 35-36
[50] V.H. Oppenheim, Why
Oil Prices Go Up (1) The Past: We Pushed Them. Foreign Policy: No. 25, Winter,
1976-1977: pages 37-38
[51] V.H. Oppenheim, Why
Oil Prices Go Up (1) The Past: We Pushed Them. Foreign Policy: No. 25, Winter,
1976-1977: page 44
[52] Time, The Cast of
Analysts. Time Magazine: March 12, 1979: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,948424,00.html
[53] V.H. Oppenheim, Why
Oil Prices Go Up (1) The Past: We Pushed Them. Foreign Policy: No. 25, Winter,
1976-1977: page 48
[54] V.H. Oppenheim, Why
Oil Prices Go Up (1) The Past: We Pushed Them. Foreign Policy: No. 25, Winter,
1976-1977: pages 50-51
[55] V.H. Oppenheim, Why
Oil Prices Go Up (1) The Past: We Pushed Them. Foreign Policy: No. 25, Winter,
1976-1977: page 53
[56] F. William Engdahl,
A Century of War: Anglo-American Oil Politics and the New World Order.
[57] The Observer, Saudi
dove in the oil slick. The Guardian: January 14, 2001: http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2001/jan/14/globalrecession.oilandpetrol
[58] Peter Gowan, The
Globalization Gamble: The Dollar-Wall Street Regime and its Consequences:
marxsite.com/Gowan_DollarWallstreetRegime.pdf: page 10
[59] Dharam Ghai, ed.,
The IMF and the South: The Social Impact of Crisis and Adjustment (London:
United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1991), 81
[60] Dharam Ghai, ed.,
The IMF and the South: The Social Impact of Crisis and Adjustment (London:
United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1991), 82
[61] Robert
O’Brien and Marc Williams, Global Political Economy: Evolution and
Dynamics, 2nd ed. Palgrave Macmillan: 2007: page 223
[62] Gisela Bolte, et.
al., Jumbo Loans, Jumbo Risks. Time Magazine: December 3, 1984: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,923771,00.html
[63] Allen B. Frankel
and Paul B. Morgan, A Primer on the Japanese Banking System. Board of Governors
of the Federal reserve System, International Finance Discussion Papers: Number
419, December 1991: page 3
[64] A. W. Mullineux,
International Banking and Financial Systems: A Comparison. Springer, 1987: page
63
[65] Robert K.
Schaeffer, Understanding Globalization: The Social Consequences of Political,
Economic, and Environmental Change. Rowman & Littlefield, 2005: page 82
[66] Peter Gowan, The
Globalization Gamble: The Dollar-Wall Street Regime and its Consequences:
marxsite.com/Gowan_DollarWallstreetRegime.pdf: page 12
[67] David Rockefeller,
Memoirs.
[68] Peter Dale Scott,
The Road to 9/11: Wealth, Empire, and the Future of
[69] Peter Dale Scott,
The Road to 9/11: Wealth, Empire, and the Future of
[70] Peter Dale Scott,
The Road to 9/11: Wealth, Empire, and the Future of
[71]
[72] Naomi Klein, The
Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism. Macmillan: 2007: page 77
[73] Holly Sklar, ed.,
Trilateralism: The Trilateral Commission and Elite Planning for World
Management. South End Press: 1980: pages 201-203
[74] Holly Sklar, ed.,
Trilateralism: The Trilateral Commission and Elite Planning for World
Management. South End Press: 1980: pages 91-92
[75] Peter Dale Scott,
The Road to 9/11: Wealth, Empire, and the Future of
[76] F. William Engdahl,
A Century of War: Anglo-American Oil Politics and the New World Order.
[77] F. William Engdahl,
A Century of War: Anglo-American Oil Politics and the New World Order.
[78] Joseph B. Treaster,
Paul Volcker: The Making of a Financial Legend. John Wiley and Sons, 2004: page
36
[79] Joseph B. Treaster,
Paul Volcker: The Making of a Financial Legend. John Wiley and Sons, 2004: page
37
[80] Joseph B. Treaster,
Paul Volcker: The Making of a Financial Legend. John Wiley and Sons, 2004: page
38
[81] Joseph B. Treaster,
Paul Volcker: The Making of a Financial Legend. John Wiley and Sons, 2004:
pages 57-60
[82] Robert
O’Brien and Marc Williams, Global Political Economy: Evolution and
Dynamics, 2nd ed. Palgrave Macmillan: 2007: page 223
[83] Robert
O’Brien and Marc Williams, Global Political Economy: Evolution and
Dynamics, 2nd ed. Palgrave Macmillan: 2007: page 224
[84] Robert
O’Brien and Marc Williams, Global Political Economy: Evolution and
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[85] A. Paloni and M.
Zonardi, eds., Neoliberalism: A Critical Introduction.
[86] A. Paloni and M.
Zonardi, eds., Neoliberalism: A Critical Introduction.
[87] Joseph Stiglitz,
Globalization and its Discontents.
[88] Michel
Chossudovsky, The Globalization of Poverty and the New World Order, 2nd ed.
[89] Marc Williams,
International Economic Organizations and the
[90] Michel
Chossudovsky, The Globalization of Poverty and the New World Order, 2nd ed.
[91] Joseph Stiglitz,
Globalization and its Discontents.
[92] Joseph Stiglitz,
Globalization and its Discontents.
[93] Robert
O’Brien and Marc Williams, Global Political Economy: Evolution and
Dynamics, 2nd ed. Palgrave Macmillan: 2007: page 224
[94] Robert
O’Brien and Marc Williams, Global Political Economy: Evolution and
Dynamics, 2nd ed. Palgrave Macmillan: 2007: page 224
[95] Robert
O’Brien and Marc Williams, Global Political Economy: Evolution and
Dynamics, 2nd ed. Palgrave Macmillan: 2007: page 225
[96] Robert Gilpin,
Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order,
Princeton University Press, 2001: page 81
[97] Robert Gilpin,
Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order,
Princeton University Press, 2001: page 97
[98] Robert Gilpin,
Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order,
Princeton University Press, 2001: pages 97-98
Research related links
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